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Condusion 
In this paper it has been argued that 
among the three durable solutions to 
refugee problems, integration of the 
Mozambican refugees into the 
Malawian society seems the most plau- 
sible solution for the time being, at 
least until peace and security is fully 
restored in Mozambique. Refugees are 
resourceful and every effort should be 
made to encourage self-reliance. This 
can best be achieved by introducing 
various developmental projects that 
will help them generate income. Do- 
nor agencies must realize that concen- 
tration on relief aid alone is insufficient 
when assisting refugees. However, the 
complex issues of refugee participa- 
tion, equal membership within the 
host community and supporting host- 
refugee cooperation require further re- 
search and investigation. 
Notes 
1. Initially tractors were used, but this 
proved difficult because funds were una- 
vailable for managerial costs. Eventually 
ox ploughs were employed instead. 
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The Political Dynamics of Refugee Food 
Assistance in Malawi1 
Agnes Callamard 
The assistance that has been provided 
to Mozambican refugees in Malawi in 
the last five years is based on a "care 
and maintenance" approach. Its main 
objectives are to insure the protection 
of refugees and to implement life-sav- 
ing activities. Central to the "care and 
maintenance" program (and indeed to 
all types of emergency assistance), is 
the delivery of food relief and of non- 
food items, such as blankets, clothes 
and cooking pots. Up until 1993, the 
food assistance program in Malawi 
was hailed by international observers 
as successful in that it had avoided 
many of the pitfalls that had character- 
ised similar programs in other parts of 
the world, such as corruption, contin- 
ued insecurity and transport difficul- 
ties. As of 1993, however, the feeling 
regarding the program was somewhat 
different. In the course of a couple of 
months, the diversion, misuse and cor- 
ruption of international food assist- 
ance had become a constant subject of 
conversation, scrutiny, investigation 
and tensions in the refugee camps as 
well as among national and interna- 
tional policy-makers. The situation in 
and outside the areas of settlement was 
in fact so serious that it led to a number 
of arrests for corruption, resignations 
among Malawian staff, and possibly 
the murder of a camp leader in 
Chifunga Refugee Camp. 
The diversion and misuse of food 
relief or any type of international as- 
sistance in Malawi and elsewhere un- 
derlines the problematic interaction 
between international, national, and 
local actors, who are competing for the 
control of a principal source of political 
and economic power. Further, the abil- 
ity of local actors (both refugees and 
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Malawians) to advance their own im- 
mediate economic interests and ul- 
timately to impose a locally-based 
restructuring of "humanitarian" as- 
sistance has been facilitated by the ex- 
isting international and national 
political uncertainty, and more impor- 
tantly, mandated by the difficult eco- 
nomic and political reconstruction of 
the region. 
Food Assistance in Malawi: 
The Actors 
From 1987 onwards, World Food Pro- 
gram (WFP) has been the principal 
donor of basic food distributed to the 
refugees and has been responsible for 
the coordination of international and 
internal transport, storage and han- 
dling of the items distributed as well as 
the milling of maize. The quantity of 
food distributed is, in principle, deter- 
mined by the number of refugees. 
Since 1990, over 100,000 MT of cereal 
and non-cereal foodstuffs has been 
provided by WFP. Up to 1991, maize 
was purchased in Zimbabwe and Ma- 
lawi but after this time, because of the 
1991-92 drought in southern Africa, 
WFP had to rely on donations from the 
USA and European countries. WFP 
food assistance has been supple- 
mented in the past by UNHCR special 
trust fund contributions for the local or 
regional purchase of food and for the 
milling costs of the maize. As of 1992, 
however, WFP assumed the responsi- 
bility for providing all food commodi- 
ties, including sugar, salt and 
supplementary food previously pur- 
chased by UNHCR.2 
The Malawi Red Cross Society 
(MRCS) is in charge of the distribution 
of food and non-food items, a funda- 
mental function of the food relief pro- 
gram. Its operations, including the 
salary and training of staff, are funded 
70 percent by the UNHCR under a 
- 
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tripartite agreement (MRCSI 
UNHCRIMalawi government). The 
balance is funded by the International 
Federation of Red Cross Societies with 
a grant from the EEC. The distribution 
of food (and non-food) items occurs 
every two weeks in all 12 refugee-af- 
feded districts. All refugees presently 
hold a refugee card that indicates the 
number of persons in their family. This 
determines the amount of food re- 
ceived. The distribution is organized 
and supervised by employees of the 
MRCS with the assistance of refugee 
volunteers, also called "tippers." The 
volunteers, usually men, measure the 
various items with the help of a cup 
(for instance 1 cup = 280 grams of 
beans) or bucket (1 bucket = 1 kg of 
flour) and fill up bags that refugees 
bring with them. The "food basket" 
consists in the following items distrib- 
uted per refugee per fortnight: maize 
flour or ufa (5.6 kg), beans or peas (0.84 
kg); oil (1 tin per family); sugar (0.28 
kg), salt (0.07 kg) and groundnuts (0.28 
kg). 
In theory, the ration should consti- 
tute a total of 2000 callday per person, 
a standard suggested by the UNHCR 
nutritionist and agreed upon by the 
government, UNHCR and WFP at a 
Food Aid Cosrdination Unit meeting. 
But the food monitoring administered 
Table 1: Average Caloric Ration 
in 1990, by Refugee Camps 
Refugee Camp Energy Content (caL 
Changambika 1,901 
Chifunga 2,034 
Chiringa 1,566 
Kamphata 1,643 
Kunyenda 1,915 
Lilongwe 1,622 
Mangochi 1,630 
Mankhokwe 1,693 
Muloza 1,451 
Ntcheu 1,609 
Nyarnithutu 1,780 
Tengani 1,572 
Source: Centerfor Disdasc Control, 
Review of Health and Nutrition 
Program in Malawi, 
November 1990, p.8. 
by NGOs has revealed important dis- 
crepancies between the official food 
ration and the one actually received by 
refugees (Tables 1 and 2). 
Food Diversion and Reduction: 
International and Local 
Responsibilities 
The actual reduction and/or disap- 
pearance of food has occurred at two 
different levels of responsibility, 
namely international and local. Each 
have struggled to control the relief 
program. 
The international level includes the 
first stage of the food assistance pro- 
gram, that is, the international mobili- 
zation of food items. In several 
instances, the international organiza- 
tions (and hence the donor countries) 
have failed to supply the Malawian 
program withcertain items or with the 
required quantity. Between December 
1988 and June 1989, and again in 1990, 
groundnuts for example have not been 
available for delivery to the refugees. 
The elimination of this item from the 
food basket is the direct consequence 
of a UNHCR budget crisis and the en- 
suing cuts in the Malawian program 
($6 million in 1989 and 1990). These 
budget cuts resulted in the serious de- 
terioration of refugee nutritional sta- 
tus and an outbreak of pellagra, a 
dermatological disease due to vitamin 
deficiency. Following publicising of 
the crisis through the French and 
American media by Mddecins Sans 
Fronti&res (MSF), donaticns increased, 
allowing the partial re-introduction of 
groundnuts. More recently, in July 
1993, WFP decided that in the up-com- 
ing months, sugar will not be included 
in the food basket distributed to the 
refugees. This decision followed the 
spontaneous return home of an un- 
known number of Mozambicans and 
occurred in the midst of much contro- 
versy surrounding the issue of repa- 
triation. This decision was implicitly, if 
not explicitly, based on three grounds: 
a) to instigate "push factors" to en- 
courage repatriation; b) to align the 
content of food ration in Malawi with 
the one in Mozambique; and c) to pre- 
vent the growth of an underground 
market in Malawian sugar within Ma- 
lawi and the surrounding countries. 
The decision was indeed prompted by 
what was perceived by the interna- 
tional community in Malawi as the in- 
creasingly unmanageable abuse of the 
food assistance program by both refu- 
gees and local Malawians. 
Diversion of food rations at the local 
level has been a recurrent, if not en- 
demic problem of the food assistance 
program in Malawi from its onset. Up 
until the beginning of 1993, it was per- 
ceived by most international and na- 
tional actors as a manageable problem 
and a "normal" state of affairs that did 
not jeopardise the health and nutri- 
tional status of refugees, nor threaten 
the overall objectives of the program. 
Referred to as "under-tipping" (and 
alternatively "over-tipping"), this 
"misuse" of food relief takes place dur- 
ing the distribution of food itself. It 
underlines the stratification and 
power-making process occurring 
within the refugee camp and the fun- 
damental role played by international 
assistance in fostering this pro~ess.~ 
The "tippers" (volunteer refugees who 
dole out the ration) reduce or increase 
the quantity of food they are in charge 
of distributing, depending on the iden- 
tity of the refugees. In collusion with 
local Red Cross workers and section 
Table 2: Average Caloric Ration in 1992 (cals.) 
Refugee Camp Jan. Peb. March April May June 
Chifunga 1,701 1,832 1,978 1,728 1,643 1,526 
Lisongwe 1,953 2,099 1,700 1,743 1,578 1,926 
Ntcheu 1,809 - - - 1,774 - 
Kunyenda 1,800 1,656 - - - - 
Mankhokwe 1,647 1,927 1,619 - - - 
Source: MSF Monthly Report, 1992/ (from sampled camps only) 
leaders to whom they 
owe their position, the 
tippers privilege 
themselves, friends, 
family members and 
section leaders at the 
expense of other refu- 
gees. In the course of a 
food distribution 
witnessed by the 
writer in the summer 
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of 1992, one refugee who happened to 
be a section leader was first given 3 
times the ration he was supposed to 
receive. (Because of the presence of 
NGO workers, his sack was then emp- 
tied and the food re-distributed). Out 
of 30 ufa rations sampled on this day, 
24 were under the required amount, 
and" for six of them more than 7 kg of 
ufa were missing.' 
Since the first months of 1993 when 
spontaneous repatriation began, inter- 
national organizations and NGOs in 
Malawi have become increasingly 
alarmed with the scale of food diver- 
sion and with what is being perceived 
as the misuse of food assistance. While 
under-tipping is still widely practiced, 
it is exacerbated by the disappearance 
of important stocks of food (often at 
the distribution points themselves) 
and an unprecedented underground 
market in refugee ration cards. Re- 
search conducted in the summer of 
1992 indicated that these activities 
were already taking place then, but at 
a lower rate. From the first months of 
1993 on~ards,  their scope has indeed 
increased to include refugees and 
Malawians who in the past could not 
have engaged in them, or refrained 
from doing so; a phenomenon that 
could be referred to as the "democrati- 
zation of diversion." An actual quanti- 
tative assessment of the outcome of the 
practices is difficult, but some sources 
in Malawi suspect that up to 30 percent 
of the food and non-food items distrib- 
uted were diverted. According to in- 
vestigation conducted in sections of 
Lisongwe refugee camp by some offi- 
cials, 35 percent of the families were 
not living in the camp any more but 
were nevertheless included in the food 
assistance p r~gram.~  The intensifica- 
tion of these activities has taken place 
along three main avenues. 
First, returnees who have returned 
to Mozambique near the Malawian 
border have kept their ration cards and 
return every two weeks to the distribu- 
tion points in Malawi to receive food 
rations. This phenomenon is especially 
prevalent in the self-settlements of 
Ntcheu and Dedza where most refu- 
gee huts are now deserted. The area 
now resembles a ghost town, except on 
distribution days when returnees liv- 
ing in the Angonia district of Mozam- 
bique cross the border to collect food 
and non-food items. 
Second, a number of refugees re- 
turning to Mozambique are selling, 
giving, or possibly being coerced into 
surrendering their ration cards to the 
remaining refugees, predominantly 
but not exclusively to section leaders, 
allowing them to increase their food 
rations later assigned to home con- 
sumption, sale or barter. The extent of 
the practice is difficult to quantify but 
all refugees interviewed during field- 
work in Lisongwe camp admitted 
"knowing somebody" who had at least 
two ration cards, and in some cases up 
to fifty. Further, in the course of 
investigating the intensive feeding 
center, 14 percent of sampled refugees 
were in possession of two or more 
ration cards.6 To the extent that these 
refugees can be counted among the 
"vulnerable" and that refugees are, un- 
derstandably, very reluctant to admit 
to the practice, this figure certainly un- 
derestimates the extent of the trade. 
Third, local Malawians in charge of 
the delivery of food relief are now di- 
verting important quantities of food 
from its original destination. While 
this type of activity did occur in the 
past, spontaneous repatriation has led 
to an explosion of such activity in three 
main ways. In the first place, spontane- 
ous repatriation made the task of 
"counting" refugees more difficult 
than it already was, because of prac- 
tices mentioned above and/or the 
vested interests of the Malawian em- 
ployees and representatives of OPC 
(Office of President and Cabinet) to 
keep the official count high. For in- 
stance, in June 1993, OPC estimated 
that the population of Luwani camp 
was 35,427 individuals, compared to 
the figure of 22,462 compiled by the 
Health Surveillant Assistants (HSA) 
for MSF.' Second and consequently, 
the discrepancy between the official 
and the actual number of refugees al- 
lowed local Malawians and Mozam- 
bicans involved in the distribution 
process to increase the quantity di- 
verted. Third, and most importantly, 
spontaneous repatriation and there- 
fore the imminent closure of refugee 
camps, acted as a push factor in terms 
of risk-taking. In an environment 
dominated by unemployment, pov- 
erty, political uncertainty and the ab- 
sence of economic opportunities, 
Malawians (from local government 
officials to Red Cross employees) are 
taking more risks than they have in the 
past, in anticipation of their imminent 
unemployment. 
As this brief review underlines, the 
spontaneous return of refugees to Mo- 
zambique fostered conditions for the 
emergence and development of all 
three activities. Additionally, the am- 
biguous and delayed implementation 
of repatriation and reconstruction pro- 
grams8 facilitated the adoption of the 
strategies described above. In other 
words, the frequent movements of 
Mozambican returnees across the 
Malawian border and the trade of refu- 
gee cards-which has to a large extent 
impeded the shifting of food assistance 
from Malawi to Mozambique-also re- 
sult from a repatriation policy based 
on spontaneous return and more im- 
portantly on the absence of repatria- 
tion assistance (such as the provision 
of transport or cash). According to the 
repatriation plan of action, refugees in 
Malawi are supposed to return to Mo- 
zambique "spontaneously" and with- 
out assistance, in contrast to those in 
Zimbabwe (and eventually in South 
Africa) for whom repatriation has been 
(or will be) of an organised form. 
Refugees are spontaneously return- 
ing, but it is disputed as to just how 
many of them have done so. In July 
1993, the UNHCR office in Tete esti- 
mated that in the first six months of the 
year, 215,000 refugees had gone back 
to Tete province from Malawi; a figure 
strongly disputed in Malawi itself. 
Even if the above figure of returnees is 
correct, this does not signify however 
that these refugees/returnees are not 
coming back to the camp in Malawi to 
collect their food rations, a situation 
that explained the major discrepancy 
between the figures compiled in Ma- 
lawi and Mozambique. Return of refu- 
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gees is self-organized and follows a 
strategy that best suits their interests; a 
strategy that maximizes their chances 
of physical, economic, and political 
survival and necessitates for a number 
of them to challenge an identity ( r e -  
gee or returnee?) imposed upon them 
by international standards by crossing 
the Malawian border on a bi-monthly 
basis. 
As far as these movements are con- 
cerned, one obvious way to put an end 
to them would have been to distribute 
food assistance on the same day on 
both sides of the border. The absence 
of such a regional-based organization 
of food relief underlines the difficul- 
ties that international organizations 
have faced in coordinating their activi- 
ties. The lack of coordination and co- 
operation among relief partners 
constitutes one of the most persistent 
problems of humanitarian assistance 
programs and one that has often im- 
peded their realisation and success. 
In theory, coordination mechanisms 
should be established at the onset of a 
program to allow and facilitate coordi- 
nation and cooperation at three differ- 
ent levels: among the different 
agencies of the United Nations, among 
the implementing partners (interna- 
tional and national NGOs as well as 
national governments) and between 
these two. 
In practice, however, one or several 
units of implementation tend to oper- 
ate in isolation from each other, with 
no coordination framework in place, 
or one which is too frail to constrain the 
activities of the respective actors. On a 
regional basis, the problems of coordi- 
nation are often made worse by com- 
munication problems and the large 
number of international and national 
agencies involved in assisting the 
refugees. Excessive numbers of agen- 
cies multiply the risks of duplicating 
relief activities and experiencing per- 
sonality conflicts, as well as conflicts 
over funding. All such risks currently 
influence the politics of repatriation 
and reconstruction in Mozambique, 
along with, or because of, the climate 
of uncertainty regarding the mainte- 
nance of peace. 
Conclusion 
The diversion and disappearance of 
food relief in Malawi demonstrates the 
problematic interaction and potential 
conflicts between local and interna- 
tional interests. Most importantly, it is 
also a reflection of the numerous prob- 
lems facing a country and in fact a 
whole region in the process of political 
and economic reconstruction. As such, 
these diversions do serve a "hurnani- 
tarian" purpose, whether or not it was 
the one originally conceived and or- 
ganised within international circles. 
In the final analysis, one wonders 
whether the approaches and humani- 
tarian purposes adopted by refugees 
and international actors are as dissimi- 
lar and conflicting as they appear to be 
in the field. The strategies of reluctance 
and procrastination, incessant move- 
ment and trading of assets may be 
grounded in the same principle for 
both refugees and international actors: 
to wait and see. As a returnee men- 
tioned in Mozambique! 
RENAMO and FRELIMO are on holi- 
days right now. They are eating a lot 
and getting fat. We don't know what 
they will do at the end of their vaca- 
tions. E 
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